International Law and Foreign Investigatory Subpoenas Sought to Be Served without the Consent or Cooperation of the Territorial Sovereign: Impasse or Accommodation? by Oliver, Covey T.
San Diego Law Review 
Volume 19 
Issue 2 1982 Article 9 
3-1-1982 
International Law and Foreign Investigatory Subpoenas Sought to 
Be Served without the Consent or Cooperation of the Territorial 
Sovereign: Impasse or Accommodation? 
Covey T. Oliver 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Covey T. Oliver, International Law and Foreign Investigatory Subpoenas Sought to Be Served without the 
Consent or Cooperation of the Territorial Sovereign: Impasse or Accommodation?, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
409 (1982). 
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol19/iss2/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital USD. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in San Diego Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital USD. For more information, 
please contact digital@sandiego.edu. 
International Law and Foreign
Investigatory Subpoenas Sought to
Be Served Without the Consent
or Cooperation of the




I believe Maitre Pierre Azard, whose professional skills and personal qualities
we honor here, would have been interested in the problem discussed in this arti-
cle. My wife and I knew the Azards only briefly but our recollections of their lav-
ish generosity to hordes of American law students and academics and their keen
and dispassionate intelligences are sharp. From my first professional acquain-
tance I was impressed by Professor Azard's decision to devote the remaining
years of his service to the injection of an adequate legal component into the edu-
cation of students of business management4t When, to my surprise I was later in-
vited to attempt something similar, his example helped induce me to spend a few
years in a parallel effort. Above all else, however, I remember Pierre Azard as a
vivid, effective communicator to the young of the vast sweep of French social his-
* Hubbell Professor of International Law (emeritus), University of Penn-
sylvania Law School; Tsanoff Professor of Public Affairs (emeritus), Jones Gradu-
ate School of Administration, Rice University. Professor Oliver is also a sometime
faculty member of the Institute on International and Comparative Law, University
of San Diego.
t Six semester hours of courses on law (mainly public law) and process are
required for the degree of Master of Public and Business Management at the
Jones Graduate School of Administration of Rice University. Additional courses
linking legal and policy problems are either required or offered in the second year
of the program. See GRANIS & WiNDsOR, THE CorAoPzNs OF THE MBPM CURRIC-
muLum, Working Paper Series, No. 2 Jones Graduate School of Administration
(1980).
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tory. The vision I best recall of this slight, deep-blue-eyed Norman, is when he
stood on the crumbling parapets of an ancient redoubt high above the lower
Seine.t There he recreated with words alone, precise but colorful scenes from the
grappling history of a great country.
In todays interdependent world of economic operations, inves-
tigation of possible antitrust violations is the key to effective anti-
trust administration. Customary international law and the
political principle of territorial sovereignty, however, prohibits
one state from carrying on investigative functions within another
t I am indebted to Professor Herbert L Lazerow for this marvelously Thu-
cydidean note: Chateau Gaillard dominates the Seine Valley at Les Andelys.
Richard I (the Lion-Hearted) of England was also Duke of Normandy and, in the
1190's carried on a series of skirmishes with Philip Augustus, King of France, over
control of the area. Normandy proper may be divided into two districts, the west-
ern capital being Caen, while the eastern is centered in Rouen. Between the east-
ern part and Paris lies a district known as the Vexin, an extremely fertile granary.
To secure the Vexin and to bar Philip's passage into Normandy, Richard built a
line of castles including Gisors and La Roche-Guyon, but Chateau Gaillard was
the lynch-pin because it controlled the river and the Seine Valley. Chateau Gail-
lard was built in record time 1196-1198, and Viollet-le-Duc six centuries later said
everything was sacrificed to defense and the design and workmanship were ex-
traordinarily well done. The castle is built on a rocky spur 300 feet above the
Seine, and is accessible only from the south. It is surrounded by three walls each
fifteen feet thick, and two moats. Four years after Richard's death in 1199, Philip
beseiged the castle, which fell after seven months. The accounts dispute whether
the cause of its demise was famine or the entry of French soldiers through the la-
trines. The rest of Normandy fell swiftly to the French.
Subsequent history of the castle was less noble. In 1314, King Philip IV (the
Fair) discovered that two of his three daughters-in-law, Marguerite of Burgundy
and Blanche of Artois, were carrying on adulterous affairs. The men were exe-
cuted with a cruelty shocking even for feudal times, and the women were impris-
oned at Chateau Gaillard. Marguerite was kept at the top of a tower exposed to
the icy winter winds. Philip IV died and Marguerite's husband became king of
France as John X. Marguerite's messages announcing her repentance and plead-
ing for mercy went unanswered. She died of pleurisy in the winter of 1315, leaving
John free to marry Clemence of Hungary. One writer commented that it would
have been impolitic to execute a queen, but you could have left her exposed to the
elements. Blanche was better lodged lower in the tower for ten years, before be-
ing allowed to become a nun.
The castle was used as a prison for years, the most notable prisoners being King
David H of Scotland (1334) and Charles I1 (the Bad) of Navarre (1356). It changed
hands several times during the Hundred Years' War, and was finally surrendered
to King Henry IV of France in 1591. Between 1598 and 1616, Henry IV and Louis
X=I granted to two monastic orders, the Capuchins and the Penitents of Petit-
Andelys, the right to demolish the castle and use the stone to construct their mon-
asteries, and they did destroy a large portion of the outer ramparts. Richelieu pul-
led down the donjon shortly thereafter. The purpose given for the demolition was
to prevent the castle from falling into the hands of powerful nobles and being used
against the King. The monks' desire to have low-cost building materials were
probably additional motivations. Chateau Gaillard is now a romantic ruin of By-
ronic dimensions. See 1 W. CmmcmiL., A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEO-
PLES 239-41, 247 (1966); A. BROQuELET, Nos CHATEAuX 132-35 (1924); J. FAVIER,
PHILLIPPE LE BEL 527-29 (1978); A. POLLE, FROm DOOmESDAY BOOK TO MAGNA
CARTA 1087-1216 (The Oxford History of England) 375, 383-84 (1955); 4 M. GUIZOT,
HISTORY OF FRANCE 219 (ca. 1869) (trans. Black n.d); 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITrANICA
38-39, 345 (1970).
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state without consent. Recognizing the existence of these princi-
ples, the United States Circuit Court ofAppealsfor the District of
Columbia, in the case of Federal Trade Commission v. Compa-
gnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Moussor held that the authority of
the United States to prescribe rules of law with international ap-
plication does not necessarily encompass the power to enforce
such rules abroad via service of process. The author demon-
strates that this holding is compelled by international law and
suggests that the impasse between nations, which results from the
enforcement dilemma, must be resolved through cooperation at
the international level.
INTRODUCTION
This essay deals with the investigation of certain types of busi-
ness conduct, a necessary step preliminary to the application of
national laws seeking to maintain the effectiveness of a national
market process by sanctioning anticompetitive practices arranged
abroad. In the world of today, and that of the last seven decades,'
the antinomy between national concern over foreign-based re-
straints of trade (mainly foreign-based cartels) 2 and foreign-
linked monopoly power and the permitted reach of national au-
thority under international law 3 continues to be a serious prob-
lem. To date, several attempts to resolve this policy problem by
international convention have been thwarted,4 but a significant
group of states, which includes France, have agreed to a suprana-
tional law of antitrust designed to ensure against impediments to
the free movement of goods within the European Economic Com-
munity.5 The creation of a second vast antitrust area among the
1. In 1911 the Supreme Court applied the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 so as
to include in its order, dissolving the American Tobacco Company conglomerate,
the British-American Tobacco Company, a company organized under the laws of
the United Kingdom. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
See also, RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, § 18 Reporters' note 2 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
2. United States v. Holophane Co., 119 F. Supp. 114 (S.D. Ohio 1954), affd per
curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
3. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
(Certification from the Supreme Court for lack of quorum of qualified justices).
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1; SWEENEY, OLIVER, AND LEECH, THE INTERNA-
TiONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as SWEENEY].
4. L. SCHWARTZ AND J. FLYNN, AITITRUmT & REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES: FREE
ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (5th ed. 1977); DAVIDOW, QUixOTIc
QUEST:. THE SEEKING OF A WORLD COMPETITION CODE (1979).
5. Treaty establishing the European Community, Mar. 25, 1957, Treaty of
Rome, arts. 85 and 86, 298 U.W.T.S. 14.
developed nations has tended to diminish an older resistance to
the idea of legal intrusion into the private sector for the enforce-
ment of competition.6 However, the development of this second
antitrust area, vis-a-vis the Treaty of Rome and subsequent juris-
prudence of the European Community Court of Justice, has bred
a new resistance. This new resistance focuses on the allocation of
authority between enforcement areas to control the phenomena
of anticompetitive practices that involve the occasionally incon-
gruent interests of both areas concerned. A further complication
arises from the authority of the constituent states of the Euro-
pean Economic Community to develop and adhere to national an-
titrust policy not pre-empted by Community authority.7
More specifically, the investigation of certain types of business
conduct is the preliminary step to determine whether probable
cause exists for instituting antitrust charges against foreign flrms,
in the national market sought to be policed. What happens when
national investigators, before charges are brought, attempt to se-
cure witnesses and documents from abroad that pertain to an an-
titrust investigation? What are the teachings of international law
as to investigator self-help in this regard? What alternatives exist
involving the participation of foreign states where witnesses and
documents are found? Is it possible that states which mutually
accept the authority under international law of each to apply its
6. The resistances ranged from trenchant opposition from enterprises
within-and sometimes the governments of-the United Kingdom, Belgium, the
Netherlands and Switzerland, to disinterest or faint concern, in France, Italy,
Spain, and Scandanavia. Cf. Reports and Proceedings of the Committee on The
Extra-Territorial Application of Restrictive Trade Legislation, International Law
Association, 51st Report, passim (Tokyo 1964); Haight, International Law and Ex-
traterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YAmE L. J. 639 (1954). The posi-
tion taken by the RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, was resisted within the American
Law Institute to extraordinary lengths by Sir Harley Shawcross and others re-
tained by international oil companies. However, when the Federal German Re-
public specifically provided for the application of antitrust law on an economic
effects basis and the Court of European Community followed suit in interpreting
the Treaty of Rome, resistance faded and disappeared with a final rush, jurisdic-
tion to prescribe (i.e., to attach legal consequences to conduct outside the territory
that has deleterious economic effects within it) when the internal impact of oil
price hikes by the state cartel of oil producing states (OPEC) was felt. See SwEE-
NEY, supra note 3.
7. The national antitrust laws of constituent states in the European Eco-
nomic Community vary from the explicit regulation of Germany to the lack of any
national antitrust laws in several members. France does not have a fully-devel-
oped antitrust law, but approaches some market problems through ministerial
oversight of the pricing policies of enterprises. In general, there is more coopera-
tion and mutual toleration as between the West German national and the suprana-
tional administrators than between the managers of the dispersed national system
of the United Kingdom and the antitrust offices of the European Commission at
Brussels. As yet no cases of French national recalcitrance as to community obli-
gation, as have arisen in other areas, have become notorious in the antitrust area.
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antitrust law to parties before its courts might nonetheless differ
sharply as to the investigatory power of the one in the territory of
the other? If so, why? And if so, what can be done?
This article is a situation report presenting issues between
France and the United States as to the investigatory phase of an-
titrust. I shall discuss a recent case in which a leading American
court8 addressed the limits placed on American power pursuant
to international law and statutes of the United States (as they
were at that time) to command French companies by mail to re-
spond to antitrust investigations conducted in the United States
by instrumentalities of the United States. I will also report an ex-
isting contradiction between new United States statutory law au-
thorizing investigatory service of subpoenas abroad and new
French law forbidding, on civil and criminal penalties, disclosure
to foreign investigative agencies of information commanded by
them directly within France. Finally, possible lines for resolution
of the present difficulty will be briefly considered, not in terms of
mechanisms but rather, in terms of national will and possible re-
ciprocal interests.
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION INVESTIGATION OF THE
FIBERGLASS INSULATION INDUSTRY: SUBPOENA DUCES
TECUM TO COMPAGNIE DE SAuNT-GOBArN-PoNT-
A-MoussoN, MAILED TO FRANCE
In 1977 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) began a nonpub-
lic9 investigation of the fiberglass insulation industry in the
United States to determine whether there had been possible vio-
lations of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA).10 Compa-
8. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
has a very heavy load of public law cases involving the competency of agencies
and instrumentalities of the United States Government because provisions of the
law of federal venue that favor first instance litigation in the federal district courts
below it. The D.C. Circuit enjoys a high reputation amongst tribunals in the
United States. As is the case with other busy courts of appeal, "panels" of three
judges often act for the court as a whole, although certain decisions are decided or
reheard en bane. These panels are not "chambres" in the continental sense, as no
specific linkage to subject matter specialization exists as to the panels.
9. The investigation was a preliminary administrative inquiry as to probable
cause for formal action, whether of a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial nature. The
process is comparable to the investigations of possible suits to enforce the anti-
trust laws undertaken by the Department of Justice before filing a civil suit or
bringing a potential criminal case to a federal grand jury.
10. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson,
gnie St.-Gobain-Pont-d-Mousson (SGPM), a multinational French
enterprise, was known to own and control a major producer of
fiberglass insulation material in the United States. There was rea-
son to believe that the FTC wished to investigate the overall influ-
ence and economic power of SGPM in the American market.
For reasons not material to this article three efforts to serve
SGPM within the United States with investigatory subpoenas
failed. The fourth effort, a demand sent to the SGPM in France
by registered mail, became the subject of the litigation specifically
relevant here. The subpoena stated that addressees in France
were required to appear before a named examiner for the FTC in
the United States and to produce listed documents and records.
Failure to appear would subject the addressees to the penalties of
(United States) law for failure to appear. When the addressees
did not appear or produce the documents, the FTC asked the Fed-
eral District Court for the District of Columbia for an enforcement
order pursuant to a statutory provision for judicial support to ad-
ministrative agencies. SGPM did not contest the jurisdiction of
the district court because the court's process as to the enforce-
ment order had been served in the United States. SGPM was de-
nied its motion to stay the enforcement of the investigatory
subpoena. On appeal, the Circuit Court for the District of Colum-
bia remanded the case to the trial court and ordered it to recon-
sider whether, inter alia, its construction of the statutory
authority of the FTC to issue the investigatory subpoena mailed
to France conformed to the principle that American statutes are
to be construed in conformity with accepted principles of interna-
tional law, where a contradiction is not manifestly or unavoidably
the intent of Congress.l The trial court adhered to its original
ruling that a judicial enforcement order should issue holding that
the investigatory subpoena was authorized under United States
constitutional and statutory law.
After the case had been argued before the district court on re-
mand of the record, but before the consideration of the case by
the circuit court on the second appeal, the Embassy of France at
Washington, on instructions from the Quay d'Orsay, protested
the service by mail in France as "inconsistent with ... general
principles of international law.. ." and as constituting "a failure
to recognize French sovereignty. . . " The note also recorded
that France had previously stated formal reservations "regarding
636 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Saint Gobain]. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-
77 (1976) (Emphasis added).
11. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 38
Reporters' notes; RESTATEMENT § 3, comment j, and Reporters' note 2.
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the application in France of the principle of pre-trial discovery of
documents characteristic of common law countries .... )12
As far as is known, the Department of State neither responded
to this note nor did it communicate the note to the various Ameri-
can authorities as requested by France. According to the opinion
of the circuit court the French note appeared in the case as an ex-
hibit to a supplemental memorandum of the appellant (SGPM).
The reviewing court concluded:
that, at the time the subpoena was served, Congress intended to authorize
the FTC to employ only those customary and legitimate methods of serv-
ice of compulsory process commonly employed by American courts and
administrative agencies when serving its subpoenas abroad. Because
service of compulsory process by registered mail had not customarily
proved a legitimate means of summoning a third-party witness to appear,
with or without documents, in an agency investigation, we find that the
method of service employed by the FTC in this case was unauthorized
and hence invalid.13
The district court was ordered to vacate its enforcement orders
and to dismiss the case.
The majority opinion by Judge Wilkey is a carefully analyzed
decision based upon the difference between the jurisdiction of a
state under customary international law to prescribe its rule of
law to defendants properly before its tribunals, and the lack of ju-
risdiction by a state (under international law) to conduct govern-
mental investigations in the territory of another without the
consent of that state. The latter was characterized as clearly a
part of jurisdiction to enforce, which under customary interna-
tional law is always territorial, whereas jurisdiction to fashion the
rule may either be territorial on the basis of the loci of actions
and effects or be based on other principles of jurisdiction to pre-
scribe, such as the nationality and protective principles.14 In the
majority decision the above distinctions, first effectively analyzed
in the Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States (1965)15 and now being re-incorporated16 in a re-
vised version thereof, are applied with precision, particularly at
the interface of the two principles of jurisdiction, as discussed in
12. 636 F.2d at 1306.
13. Id. at 1306-07.
14. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, §§ 26-29, 33, 34-36.
15. Id. §§ 6-9, 31, 44, 79.
16. The American Law Institute does not authorize the citation of work that is
still in draft stage; nonetheless, it can be stated without objection from the Insti-
tute that the analytical pattern as to jurisdiction of states under customary inter-
national law pioneered in the original RESTATEMENT is kept for the revision.
Restatement, section 7, which states, "A state having jurisdiction
to prescribe a rule of law does not necessarily have jurisdiction to
enforce it in all cases ......
The court explained:
When an American court orders enforcement of a subpoena requiring
the production of documents and threatens penalties for noncompliance
with that subpoena, it invokes the .enforcement jurisdiction, rather than
the prescriptive jurisdiction, of the United States. The two types of juris-
diction are not geographically coextensive-[a] state having jurisdiction to
prescribe a rule of law does not necessarily have jurisdiction to enforce it
in all cases, for unlike a state's prescriptive boundaries, enforcement juris-
diction by and large continues to be strictly territorial. 17
The distinction just noted was the second major thrust of analy-
sis by a three-judge panel of the court of appeals. The distinc-
tion's relevance to the outcome is indicated by the result of the
court's prior identification of a hiatus in the statutory authority of
the FTC to serve an investigatory order by mail abroad. Section 5
of the FTCA authorizes the FTC to serve "[clomplaints, orders,
and other processes. . ." by registered or certified mail.'8 No ter-
ritorial limitation is stated. Having determined that the demand
made in this case was not in the nature of a complaint initiating
quasi-judicial action of the FTC, the Court found the investigatory
subpoena to come within section 9 of the FTCA. Section 9 gave
the FTC the power to command the attendance of witnesses and
the production of documents "from any place within the United
States .... 19
Originating in the earlier Interstate Commerce Commission
Act2O and included in the statutory authorizations of several other
independent regulatory agencies of the federal government, sec-
tion 9 had previously been interpreted in several intermediate
federal appellate decisions in language that possibly could have
been relied upon to authorize section 9 service on a notice basis.
Such reliance was possible even though in the prior decisions it
had been noted that the quoted phrase, was designed to authorize
nation-wide subpoena service, even outside the boundaries of the
federal judicial district in which the witness resided.2' The FTC
had argued that as prior decisions had called section 9 service
akin to that required for beginning a proceeding (notice service),
the total impact of the FTCA, sections 5 and 9, was to set no statu-
tory territorial limits on the FTC's writ.
Notwithstanding this view, the circuit court concluded from the
17. 636 F.2d at 1316.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976). In particular see 15 U.S.C. § 45(f) (1976).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1976).
20. 49 U.S.C. § 12 (1976).
21. 636 F.2d at 1307-09.
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record below that by the time of this review the parties and the
court below agreed that the FTCA was "'wholly silent'22 ... re-
garding which modes of foreign service of investigatory subpoe-
nas were or were not proper ....
The court then directed itself to the ground upon which the dis-
trict court judge had found for the FTC. The court appraised the
rationale used by the district court and concluded that its opinion
was unconvincing, stressing that the lower court's failure to draw
two distinctions of critical importance to international law was
fundamental error.
The court continued in its opinion to identify those two
distinctions:
The first, based on the type of document being served; the second, based
on the type of jurisdiction being invoked. By failing to draw these crucial
distinctions, the district court failed to give adequate weight to fundamen-
tal principles of international law which disfavor methods of extraterrito-
rial subpoena service circumventing official channels of judicial
assistance, opposed judicial enforcement of investigatory subpoenas
abroad, and prohibit the particular manner of subpoena service employed
here. 24
22. Id. at 1309.
23. This conclusion had the effect of leaving the court's field for interpretation
in the light of international law wide open.
24. As a preface to the court's conclusion it stated.
Confronted with both a silent statute and an uninstructive legislative
history, the district court sought guidance in the breadth of authority
granted by the Constitution to Congress to regulate commerce with for-
eign nations-a power 'as great if not greater, than its power to regulate
interstate commerce.' When Congress created the FTC as the agency
charged with investigation and regulation of unfair trade practices, the
district court concluded, it must have intended that agency to wield the
'broadest power to make commerce, foreign and domestic, fair.' From the
FTC's discretionary authority to investigate and regulate foreign com-
merce, the district court thus inferred the Commission's power to serve its
process abroad ....
Since past judicial interpretations of statutory language identical to that
in FTC Act section 9 had studiously avoided 'reading into the statute arti-
ficial limits on the investigatory power of the agencies,' the district court
chose to read that section as presumptively authorizing the FTC to deliver
its subpoenas over a limitless geographic area.
By implication, the district court also created a presumption in favor of
any means of subpoena service which the FTC might decide to employ. In
creating this presumption, the court explicitly rejected the notion that any
'clear statement' of congressional intent was required to authorize any
particular method of foreign service. Not only had Congress previously
authorized direct service of process abroad without such a 'clear state-
ment,' the court suggested, but there are no 'generally applicable princi-
ples of international law regarding [permissible or impermissible]
methods of service to which Congress might be expected to defer.'
636 F.2d at 1310.
In the court's arrangement of its analysis, which I have re-
versed for purposes linked to the convenience of the foreigri
reader, the court proceeded immediately from the foregoing to a
showing of the lower court's error as to the weight to be given in
American courts to principles of customary international law.
These latter principles are discussed fully in the opinion, but to
digest every step in the process in this article will deflect its ulti-
mate purpose, which is to identify an unresolved contradiction be-
tween what United States agencies are now specifically
authorized to do in antitrust investigations and how the circuit
courts will rule based on provisions found in customary interna-
tional law. Suffice it to say that the ultimate teaching of the court
in this case, relying upon Supreme Court authority,2 5 as to the
standard for interpreting acts of Congress that might by some
constructions trespass upon international law is that:
Liberal judicial interpretations of agency power are not justified when
agency action threatens to have extraterritorial, rather than merely na-
tional, impact .... [Clourts are bound wherever possible to construe
strictly federal statutes conferring subject matter jurisdiction on domestic
agencies to avoid possible conflicts with contrary principles of interna-
tional law ... 26
So much for the interpretation of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act of 1914, as such. We turn now to what the Congress in
more recent times has provided as to antitrust investigations in
which witnesses and documents located abroad are sought to be
commanded to appear or to be produced within the United States.
We also consider the problems of witnesses and probative docu-
ments abroad sought for judicial (and quasi-judicial) processes
within the United States where the defendants are properly them-
selves before the tribunal, both under domestic and international
law. Requests for judicial assistance, whether ad hoe or under in-
ternational agreements, are outside the scope of present concern,
as they are obvious alternatives that are limited only by their
availability through arrangements specifically accepted by both
states.
THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE COMMAND AS TO THE RUNNING OF
ANITUST SUBPOENAS ABROAD
Under its Constitution the United States is unavoidably a dual-
ist country so far as the relationship of international to municipal
law is concerned.27 Although the Constitution empowers Con-
25. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
26. 636 F.2d at 1322-23.
27. A monistic theory of law considers international and municipal law parts
of a single whole. Normal monism, such as that of Kelsen, treats international law
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gress to "define and punish... Offenses against the Law of Na-
tions . . .,,28 and the Supreme Court has held that customary
international law is a part of federal law and as such overrides
state law,29 it is also well-established that violation of interna-
tional law does not invalidate an act of Congress.3 0
Parallel to this, and further evidence of inherent dualism, is the
principle that even the internal legal effects of an interior treaty
may be displaced by later legislation inescapably contrary to the
treaty.31 The former doctrine is contradicted (in words at least)
by the constitutions of certain other states, but not France. 32 In
France, the general constitutional principle is that a later statute
must comport with the terms of an earlier treaty having internal
effects as law.3 3 It is widely recognized in the United States that,
as superior to (and as delegating authority to) municipal law. Dualism (some-
times called pluralism) treats international and municipal law as different systems
that interact with each other in various ways. In some dualist states the constitu-
tion provides that in certain aspects international law shall prevail over, and in
cases of conflict, invalidate, national law. In other dualist states international law
is treated as applicable only to the extent that it is not conflict With domestic law,
or some portions thereof, such as federal law in a federal system. See generally
SWEENEY, supra note 3.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
29. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), approving Jes-
sup's argument, made very shortly after the decision in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), stated that frules of international law should not be
left to divergent and perhaps parochial state [of the Union] interpretations." The
court went on to say that Jessup's rationale was equally applicable to the Ameri-
can act of state doctrine, for which the court did not claim the status of interna-
tional law but only of a court-made rule designed to reduce judge-induced effects
on United States international relations. See SWEENEY, supra note 3. See also
Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 72-73 (1941).
30. Schroeder v. Bissell, 5 F.2d 838 (1st Cir. 1925); United States v. Posal, 559
F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978) resembles the '"rum-run-
ner" cases, where explicit United States statutes providing for boardings and ar-
rests of vessels indentiflable as foreign in "customs enforcement areas" were
applied even though quite dubious as to validity under international law; Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957).
31. See generally SWEENEY, supra note 3.
32. Id.
33. Id. Although there are nuances of difference, the constitutions of the 4th
and 5th French Republics both provide that treaties cannot be invalidated as to
internal effect by subsequent inconsistent national legislation or decree-laws. As
to cases under the Constitution of the 4th Republic, see Oliver, Impediments to
American Investment in France, 2 Am. J. COmp. I 474 (1953). Article 54 of the
Constitution of the 5th Republic is not quite as clear as was the earlier constitu-
tion that posterior as well as anterior laws are invalidated by treaties "duly ratified
or approved ... upon publication, [which] have an authority superior to that of
laws. . ." French scholars stress that the use of the term "superior" makes it clear
that both types of statutes are subordinated, since the norms in treaties are not
although the state may be obligated internationally one way, the
national decisionmakers may be obligated by Congress, and theo-
retically by the Constitution, to rule another way.
In the United States the Constitution is omnipotent. In a na-
tional context there is no law above it. Although not specifically
stated as a principle in the Constitution, the structure of the fed-
eral government provided by it is one of separation of powers.
While this doctrine is affected as to its rigor by the power the
courts early took to "say what the law is . .. .,-34 no court has
ever held that international law is a superior normative order to
that of the Constitution.
One effect of the foregoing is the care with which American
courts treat issues of foreign affairs policy. The courts are aware
that they might, in certain instances, pursue the trails of legal rea-
soning too far, to the detriment of American international rela-
tions. 35 Also, they have been determined to take care not to
impute to the Congress a legislative intention to put the United
States in violation of international law. The circuit court's deci-
sion in the Saint Gobain case, as we have seen, is an instance in
which this attitude was elucidated.
Thus, whereas the onus of making the United States a violator
of international law, in limited ways, lies with the executive,36 it
exists in potentially wider range with the Congress. The courts,
when interpreting the Constitution, have reviewed the foreign af-
fairs powers of the President for content.37 In regards to the Con-
gress, the courts have reviewed possibly illegal statutes to
equated with legislative acts. Intellectually this argument is reinforced by the fact
that the contrary United States rule is logically inevitable once it was deemed that
as to internal effect treaties are a species of legislation, as Jefferson asserted in his
influential MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTIcE, Sec. II, reprinted in the Consti-
tution, Jefferson's Manual, and Rules and Practice of the House of Representa-
tives, H.R. Doc. No. 94-403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1978). I am informed by
officials of the Conseil d'Etat that the administrative courts, unlike the normal law
courts, may not invalidate a "law" for inconsistency with a treaty.
34. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 LEd. 60 (1803); U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683 (1974).
35. See note 29 supra.
36. Since the executive branch (the President, his entourage, and the minis-
teries) takes the lead in international relations, the negative burden or onus usu-
ally lies with it when the United States by its conduct lays itself open to criticism
that it has violated international law. But under the American version of dualism,
Congress has immense potential for directing departures from international law
by legislation that the President would, under the Constitution (Article II, § 3), not
have the authority to disregard. For an instance involving explanations by the Ex-
ecutive to the congressional leadership as to why it would be in the national inter-
est not to execute a law, see SWEENEY, supra note 3 ("First" Hickenlooper
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act not enforced against Peru for the na-
tionalization of the International Petroleum Company).
37. See Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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determine only their scope and reach under international law.38
The difference is potentially significant, not only because of the
relative immunity of legislation from judge-made limitations, but
because in the United States the President has become the pro-
poser of most legislation, thus giving the executive branch a deri-
vate power to induce legislation including legislation that
presents international legal problems.
In this general framework the executive branch of the govern-
ment has rather consistently taken foreign policy (and interna-
tional legal) risks in favor of a wide-reaching effectiveness for the
administration of federal law against restrictive trade practices
and monopoly power (antitrust). When a wide reach for Ameri-
can antitrust law was developing, the United States stood alone as
a significant enforcer of public law against anticompetitive con-
duct. Thus, United States courts have applied (consistent with in-
ternational law after many years of confusion and disputation),39
national rules to anticompetitive conduct of actors outside its ter-
ritory to producing deleterious economic effects within national
territory. This result is reached on the same objective territorial
principle of jurisdiction that authorizes a state to apply its laws to
a person abroad who shoots bullets into the territory, assuming
that the person accused has properly been brought before the
tribunals of the state, in accordance with the laws as to the adju-
dicatory power of the tribunal.40
In general, there remains little international legal controversy
as to prescriptive jurisdiction in antitrust cases, but more recently
American efforts to compel witnesses and documents from abroad
have again become quite controversial, both as to investigative ac-
tivities and to processes before tribunals. On its face this contro-
versy seems strange, especially as between the United States and
other countries that presently have advanced antitrust systems
38. Of course, there may be judicial review for other purposes, such as con-
gruity with the enumerated legislative powers of Congress or under separation of
powers, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
39. See text accompanying notes 13-17 supra.
40. A state cannot prescribe a rule to a party owner over which it does not
have personal and subject matter jurisdiction under the relevant domestic law,
such as the due process clauses of the Constitution of the United States. If a state
having jurisdiction to adjudicate under its domestic law nonetheless does not havejurisdiction to enforce its rule under international law, its action is an interna-
tional wrong to which it may be liable to another state entitled to extend diplo-
matic protection to the person aggrieved. Cf. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 8.
and share a common interest; that a cartelist or monopolist not
escape national law in the affected state simply by localizing an-
ticompetitive machinations outside its territory.
In the earlier antitrust period mentioned above, it had been as-
sumed that reaction against subpoenas originating in the United
States and running to foreign places reflected across-the-board
hostility to antitrust laws.41 Today, however, why should the Brit-
ish House of Lords take serious umbrage when a plaintiff in a
civil4 2 antitrust suit brought in the United States subpoenas rele-
41. Cf. Haight, supra note 6. A number of early-stage resisters of the "eco-
nomic effects" doctrine as to prescriptive jurisdiction persistently cited, as proof
that international law opposed this, instances of diplomatic protests of foreign gov-
ernments, in countries then often cartel-havens, against attempted discovery or
subpoenas of documents or witnesses in United States antitrust proceedings. The
extent to which these commentators really did not see the difference between pre-
scriptive and enforcement jurisdiction in the context of the American antitrust
laws is difficult to determine. British recalcitrance has persisted, in Labor as in
Tory times, leading to the conjecture that, regardless of the ideology of the major-
ity in Parliament, the voice of "the City" is heard throughout the land.
42. See authorities cited in Federal Trade Comm'n v. Compagnie de Saint-
Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1325 n.143 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The reference is
to the suits of Westinghouse against the "Uranium Cartel," part of Westinghouse's
effort to reduce the disaster of its managerial decisions in regard to the making by
it of long-term uranium supply contracts with power companies ancillary to the
sale of power generating equipment. The price stipulated in the contracts aver-
aged $10 per pound for yellowcake. During the term of the contracts yellowcake
(uranium oxide) rose to $26 per pound, with Westinghouse still obligated to sup-
ply 65,000,000 pounds of uranium at $10 per pound. In order to attempt a defense
under the Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-615 (1978), the Westinghouse Electric
Company sued a number of British and Canadian companies under the provisions
of the Sherman Act permitting civil actions for treble damages by private parties
injured as a result of antitrust violations. See GRANm, WnmsoR A=D NYGAARD,
THE URANIUM THING: THE WESTINGHOUSE URANIMI CONTRACTS (1979), ms. in pro-
cess of publication in a study book on managerial decision-making. The defend-
ants included four companies of the Rio Tinto Mines group, long significant
elements of British Private Sector overseas investment in Spain and elsewhere.
The British protective reaction, sharp and vigorous as it was, is difficult to explain
in terms of confusion about the two types of jurisdiction, in as much as Imperial
Chemicals Industries, another bastion of British private sector foreign and domes-
tic investment, had failed to convince the European Community Court, on the eve
of British entry into the Common Market, that its participation in the Dyestuffs
Cartel through controlled subsidiaries in EEC countries could not be reached
under Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome. Thus, the British reaction against discov-
ery in the Uranium Cartel litigation must have been based on a private party-in-
duced British governmental determination not to cooperate with the Americans as
to offshore British cartels actually properly brought in as defendants, even in pri-
vate party civil litigation in the United States. Analytically, British-Canadian offi-
cial prohibitions cannot be justified under the principle that the American
plaintiff's discovery-subpoena efforts violated the principle that enforcement juris-
diction is under international law strictly territorial, at least as that principle is de-
veloped by the court of appeals in favor of France (and the French concern) in the
Saint Gobain case. It can only be explained under a national policy to protect a
cartelized national private sector from antitrust interests of a friendly state, when
the United Kingdom itself now pursues anticompetitive activities under both its
national law and under the superior law of the EEC. Under these circumstances
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vant records kept in the United Kingdom by the defendant who is
properly before an American court? Considering British member-
ship in the European Economic Community, which has a highly
developed system of antitrust law, to say nothing of the laws of
the United Kingdom against restrictive trade practices and mo-
nopolies the sharpness of the British rejection is puzzling. Why
should France, in 1980, have proscribed the communication to the
public authorities of any other country the content of documents
of anticompetitive enforcement relevance kept in France?43
The major factors in such resistance, even now that antitrust
law is no longer a public law monopoly of the United States, may
be these:
1. Residual resentment by certain powerful foreign enterprises
which, in the democratic societies in which they operate, have
great political capacity to mobilize the protective instincts of the
governments of the states of their nationalities against
remembered historic efforts of United States' agencies to apply
American antitrust laws.44
2. Substantive and procedural differences in the objectives and
modalities of United States and European Economic Community
antitrust laws which make companies and governments in Europe
prefer the application of the latter. 45
talk of "comity" seems ironic. Cf. Love, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction" The
British Protection of Trading Interests Ac 1980, 75 Am. J. Iir'L LAW 257 (1981).
43. The legal proscription in France is explained in detail in Saint Gobain, 636
F.2d at 1326 n.146. The law was effective July 17, 1980. Court's notes 144 and 145,
also, are rich sources of information and citations as to the development of laws in
various countries prohibiting response, without state authority, to foreign requests
for discovery or production of documents. In note 145 the court usefully explains
that these statutes are of two general types: some are designed to protect citizens
against official inquiries by authorities in other states (i.e., "investigative" efforts,
in the terminology developed in this case by the majority of the circuit court
panel). Others prohibit the production of any documents requested in any foreign
proceeding (including civil actions by private parties against defendants properly
before the court), unless the documents are of a type normally sent outside of the
jurisdiction in the normal course of business. The court finds the new French stat-
ute to be of the second type, although the language of the statute does not provide
specifically the above exception to the prohibition. But it does refer to an excep-
tion for international treaties or agreements, and it is through this route that the
French statute qualifies as one of the second type. It is not deemed useful to
reproduce here, in view of its print-out in note 146 of the opinion, the text of the
French statute. The "exception" aside, its language is quite sweeping as to per-
sons, entities, utterances and subject matter within the scope of the prohibition;
and the penalties for violation are severe.
44. See notes 7, 41 and 42 supra.
45. The EEC antitrust law does not have precisely the same objective as the
3. Resistance to foreign efforts at wielding any semblance of
governmental authority within the territory of a state. The exclu-
sivity of the territorial principle as to enforcement jurisdiction is
inherent in the very concept of the state and has not been moder-
ated, except by the creation of limited elements of supranational-
ity as a matter of deliberate state choice.46
IMPASSE OR ACCOIVIODATION?
The decision of the circuit court of appeals in Saint Gobain ef-
fectively created a sharp differentiation between the authority of
the FTC and the Department of Justice, pursuant to United States
law, to serve an investigative subpoena in France on a French na-
tional. Judge McGowan, in his separate, brief concurring opinion
explains:
For years it was apparently deemed necessary by the Department of Jus-
tice to serve its investigative demands [only] upon officers or directors of
foreign corporations found in the United States-as appellant concedes
the Commission could have done in this case. In 1976, however, Congress
acted to authorize the service of the Department's civil investigative de-
mands on foreign nations 'in such a manner as the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure prescribe for service in a foreign country'.... Service by reg-
istered mail in a foreign country is encompassed in that grant of
authority 4 7
Judge McGowan then added that after the Saint Gobain case was
taken under submission, Congress enacted a law, The Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1980, that Judge Mc-
Gowan assumes gives the FTC powers equivalent in this respect
to those given to the Department of Justice in 1976. However, the
majority of the panel limited this change to FTC consumer protec-
tion investigations. 8
United States laws, as it focuses on anticompetitive practices as clogs on free
movement of goods within the Community and has features that permit exemp-
tion of certain types of anticompetitive conduct from the sanction of the law.
Moreover, the continental Europeans are shocked by criminal liability, especially
on the basis of criminal conspiracy, and the awesome powers of a judge sitting in
equity with the power to imprison for civil contempt. See generally Oliver (rap-porteur), The Harmonization of Laws and the Development of Principles for the
Resolution of Conflicts of Enforcement Jurisdiction as to Transnational Monopolis-
tic and Restrictive Trade Practices, INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORT (Tokyo 1964) 544-
56, reprinted in VII Tun JOURNAL OF REPRINTS FOR ANTrrnUST LAw AND EcoNobucs
97. The Court sets out the proposed norms of the 52nd Conference of the Interna-
tional Law Association (Helsinki, 1965) bearing upon the production of documents
in Saint Gobain, 636 F.2d at 1327.
46. State choice could include, but so far has not, it seems, cooperation, rather
than the balkanization of enforcement efforts.
47. 636 F.2d at 1327.
48. Pub. L. No. 92-252, effective May 28, 1980, adds a new section 20(c) (6) (B) to
the FTCA. Note 140 of the majority opinion in Saint Gobain states that the author-
ity to mail investigatory subpoenas under this section is limited to certain con-
sumer protection investigations and hence by implication not changing the
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The fact of this subsequent congressional specification sup-
ported, in Judge McGowan's view, the decision that until the 1980
change the FTC was not authorized to make investigative service
by mail abroad, thus he saw no need for his colleagues on the
pane 4 9 to have explored "the jurisdictional distinctions and the
intricacies of international law which bulk so large in the majority
opinion .... 50
In substantially the same time frame France enacted the law
previously mentioned against removing documents from France,
unless the Government of France consents to the foreign govern-
mental investigatory order. While in federal law the frustrated
FTC may lack full foreign investigatory powers as a result of the
Saint Gobain decision and legislative history, the Department of
Justice-and presumably plaintiffs in treble damage cases-do
have such investigatory powers under explicit national law. Thus
there is a flat contradiction between American law and policy and
French law and policy. Impasse is inevitable unless the contra-
diction is ameliorated or eliminated.
The range of possible accommodation is wide, ranging from
"blind eye" arrangements, through provision for receiving and
ruling impartially on foreign requests through the diplomatic
channel, informal understandings of a reciprocal nature, or bilat-
eral treaty arrangements, to over-riding and mutually-accepted
multipartite international undertakings. There is another possi-
ble accommodation: stopping anti-competitive investigations at
national boundaries. This, of course, frustrates through failure of
proof effective use of the recognizedly valid prescription of na-
holding in the instant case as to antitrust investigatory subpoenas mailed abroad.
636 F.2d at 1325 n.140. The concurring opinion may be read as not having focused
on such a limitation:
It is also quite significant, I believe, with respect to the issue of Congres-
sional purpose and intent now before us, that after this case was finally
taken under submission on February 14, 1980, Congress enacted Public
Law 96-252, effective May 28, 1980, the 'Federal Trade Commission Im-
provements Act of 1980,' which, among other things, gave to the Commis-
sion, in language virtually identical to that used in 1976 with respect to the
Department of Justice; the same power to serve a civil investigative de-
mand upon a foreign national abroad by registered mail.
Id. at 1327-28.
This may weaken the thrust of the concurring opinion and tend to justify the
lengthy treatment of international legal issues, which Judge McGowan found un-
necessary to the disposition of the case.
49. Explained in note 48 supra.
50. 636 F.2d at 1327.
tional law (on the economic effects basis) to defendants them-
selves properly brought before national courts. Eventually this
reduces itself to the absurd cases of evaders of European Eco-
nomic Community law hiding proof in the United States and of
evaders of American antitrust law enjoying defacto immunity in
states members of the Community.
Presently United States law differentiates between the national
legal authorizations to the two antitrust enforcement agencies,
the Department of Justice and the FTC. Evenhandedness as to
national arrangements seems to dictate that either both agencies
have or both be denied external investigatory powers. But in the
sometimes less than logical world of international relations, there
is one possible reason for restricting only the FTC: it is an in-
dependent executive agency whose discretion cannot be con-
trolled (legally) by the President, in the foreign affairs interests
of the country. The Department of Justice is subject to presiden-
tial command in this and most other matters, although admittedly
the White House would sometimes be vulnerable to undesired
publicity, especially before congressional committees.
Congress, for its part, seems in both the recent enactments in-
volving service of investigative subpoenas abroad (both the De-
partment of Justice and the FTC) to have relied upon inaccurate
linkages to federal civil procedure rule 4,51 relating to the service
of judicial process abroad in order to perfect trial jurisdiction in
the federal district courts. Judge Wilkey has stressed52 that the
service of such judicial process is not an effort to exercise govern-
mental authority abroad in the territory of another state; it is sim-
ply (jurisdictional) notice of a suit that could either be defended
or lost by default. Judge Wilkey also draws attention to the fact
that the federal rule governing subpoena service 53 does not per-
mit any form of mail service anywhere, even within the United
States.
Congress does not seem, however, to have applied these dis-
tinctions in regard to its extensions of the use of the investigative
subpoena power in antitrust cases. It does not relieve the viola-
tion of international law implicit in these statutes that the investi-
gatory powers sought to be exercised are limited to civil
investigations, for these are themselves efforts to perform govern-
mental functions in the foreign state.
As previously indicated the majority of the court of appeals
panel in Saint Gobain recognized that Congress had made a lim-
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 4.
52. Id.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1976).
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ited change in the FTC authorization while the instant case was
sub judice on the issue of the FTC's subpoena authorization
under the unamended FTCA.54 The 1980 change did not apply to
the dispute before the panel, consequently, no attempt was made
to interpret this change in light of the principle calling for the res-
olution of doubts in favor of congruity with international law.
Nonetheless, there may be significance in the fact that under
these circumstances the majority of the panel taught so thor-
oughly the application of the above principle. Instinct should tell
the reader that even the 1980 change and the earlier one upon
which it was modeled55 could be found to contain a less than ab-
solute command of Congress to disregard international law.
Moreover, in view of the incorrect linkage to the federal rule on
the service of notice of suit abroad, a good case for congressional
confusion exists. It is relatively rare for a strong and effective
court to devote such detailed attention as did the majority in
Saint Gobain to principles that in the immediate future it could
not apply.
Thus, perhaps, it can be hazarded that the impasse still has
some possibility of being resolved in the simplest manner possi-
ble, by the adjustment of United States law to the international
law requirement.
Now I turn to other modalities for resolving the contradiction
between an explicit foreign reach for the American investigatory
subpoena power and the unwillingness of France to accept even a
relatively slight intrusion upon territorial sovereignty (i.e., deliv-
ery of an American investigatory subpoena through the French
postal service). Perhaps the French sense of proportionality
could be induced to distinguish between this technical intrusion
and the much more insulting cases of sending a marshal 5 6 or a
consu 5 7 out into France with similar demands. As indicated
above, the United States explicitly forbids governmental conduct
(without the consent of the territorial sovereign) by American of-
ficials within a foreign state's territory. Thus, might it be plausi-
54. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
55. See the authorization of the Department of Justice in 15 U.S.C.
§ 1312(d) (2) (1976) supra note 18 and accompanying text.
56. Limitations on the authority of United States Marshalls in this regard ex-
tending to the denial of authority to United States Consuls in the premises are set
out in SWEENEY, supra note 3.
57. Such an inducement was proposed in the study cited in note 45 supra.
ble to regard the mailed demand as a tolerated exception,
especially if the toleration were to be reciprocal over a wide range
of governmental interests, such as United States investigatory in-
terests in antitrust and consumer protection and French investi-
gatory interests as to records and documents in the United States
pertaining to wine district "appellation controls," fiscal aspects of
French business investment here, and the like. Such a modality
certainly seems to offer certain conveniences as to matters of
public administration and the mutual advancement of national in-
terests as well as of some of the interests of nationals.58
Under the right negotiating circumstances the impasse can ele-
gantly be reduced or eliminated by international agreements or
other arrangements for administrative as well as judicial assist-
ance. Reciprocal operations arrangements, modeled on those be-
tween United States antitrust authorities 59 and those of the
European Economic Community60 seem also to be of potential,
interim or long-term, utility.
In any event, there is always the possibility of an ad hoc re-
quest for cooperation, made through the diplomatic channel. Suc-
cess or rejection through this channel depends on many factors,
including the reigning "atmosphere" of relations, the presence or
absence of collateral inducements to cooperation, reciprocity, sen-
sitivity and the clout in the requested country of the potential
subject of the investigation. The diplomatic channel includes not
only bilateral exchanges but interactions within international
agencies, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, itself based in Paris.
The fundamental impediment to the foregoing possibilities is, of
course, the attitudinal inhibitions and psycho-political factors pre-
viously mentioned. But it has been recently observed:
An interesting question arises whether, as the industrialized nations of
58. The court's opinion in Saint Gobain, 636 F.2d at 1313 rL69 refers usefully to
the Multilateral Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.ILA.S.
No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163, and points out that France has the power to decide what
to honor in the way of foreign requests under this treaty, to which it is a party.
Whether the new French law, see note 43 supra, is entirely valid in view of Article
54 of the French Constitution, supra note 33, is an interesting speculation.
59. Whether France has enough national antitrust law to support interest be-
tween French and American authorities is conjectural. The Community enforce-
ment elements definitely do have such interests. See notes 42-45 supra, as to the
supranationality of Community antitrust law and to France's intransigence in
other areas where under the treaties the Community does have legal authority to
overrule France.
60. The cooperation has been principally between the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice and the Antitrust Secretariat of the European Communities
Commission.
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the world move toward the specific regulation of the same types of private
economic activity the differences in their approaches, remedies and tolera-
tions will exacerbate or relieve conflicts of jurisdiction. From one point of
view, that of achieving the general objective of social control of particu-
larly types of economic conduct, it does not seem to make much difference
which set of rules actually gets applied. But administrators and legisla-
tors in nation states as well as in the European Economic Community
proceed in economic matters from localized senses of mission. Thus the
increased number of potentially applicable sets of rules may threaten the
effective conduct of transnational business enterprise and create a com-
mon need for some system of rationalization or harmonization of regula-
tory principles. In the period 1948-52, roughly, the first major effort to
create a set of international rules for restrictive trade practices and mo-
nopoly, the Havana Charter of the aborted International Trade Organiza-
tion failed through lack of sufficient agreement among states. Later efforts
for the creation of new, positive, universal law in this sector has been
slight so far. But perhaps circumstances are changing, due both to the in-
creased array of particularistic regulatory systems and the growth of mul-
tinational enterprise.61
Perhaps the answer to the impasse lies here.
61. SWEENEY, supra note 3.

